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Introduction 
In this report the impact of Appropriate Adult (AA) safeguard training on Independent Custody Visitors 
(ICVs) and Scheme Managers (SMs) will be discussed. 
This discussion will first begin with detail on the context for the training and the necessity of the 
training (owing to issues with the implementation of the AA safeguard). In order to provide such 
context, we detail the nature of the AA safeguard and its scope, in addition to detail on the remit of 
the safeguard and the definitions of vulnerability under Code C. Thereafter, we examine the obstacles 
to implementation of the safeguard and the potential remedies for non-implementation. We offer an 
additional mechanism for scrutiny and oversight – ICVs and SMs. In order to examine the potential of 
this scrutiny and oversight mechanism, we provide detail on the roles of ICVs and SMs, and further 
explore how training has improved their understanding, knowledge, and confidence vis-à-vis the AA 
safeguard (and its implementation). We then provide detail on the event itself – including information 
on ethical approval, recruitment, and methods. In the following section, the pre-training survey results 
are discussed, the training described, and the impact of the event (evidenced through a comparison 
of the pre- and post-training survey results) explored. We then identify areas for improvement, based 
on attendee/respondent feedback.  
Part 1: The AA Safeguard and Problems with Implementation 
The AA Safeguard  
The AA safeguard aims to protect the rights of suspects who are (a) under 181 or (b) 18 or over but 
considered ‘vulnerable’. This safeguard can be found principally in Code C to the Police and Criminal 
Evidence (PACE) Act 1984.2 In respect of those over the age of 18, there are two main ‘categories’ of 
vulnerability under Code C, premised upon (i) mental health condition or (ii) mental disorder. Crucially, 
 
1 This was set at 17 prior to R (on the application of HC) [2017] UKSC 73. See R (on the application of HC) v The 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2013] EWHC 982 
(Admin). 
2 Home Office, Code C Revised Code of Practice for the detention, treatment and questioning of persons by Police 
Officers (TSO, 2019).  
however, the suspect must display one or more of the characteristics under the ‘functional test’.3 
Under this functional test, an individual who is vulnerable is someone who has difficulty understanding 
or communicating effectively the implications of any procedures or processes, is unable to understand 
what they are told or asked as well as any answers they may provide, may provide unreliable, 
misleading or incriminating evidence without knowing or wishing to do so, or may otherwise be 
suggestible or acquiescent. Prior to the changes in 2018, the safeguard was available to those under 
the age of 18 and adults considered ‘mentally vulnerable’ (adults who, because of their mental state 
or capacity, may not understand the significance of what is said, of questions or of their replies) or 
‘mentally disordered’ (adults with any ‘disorder or disability of the mind’). 
There are a number of individuals who can perform the role of the AA. For those under 18, the AA can 
be a parent, guardian, a person from a local authority or voluntary organisation (where the young 
person is in the care of that local authority or voluntary organisation), or a social worker. When such 
individuals are unavailable, the AA may be any ‘responsible adult’ who is aged 18 or above, subject to 
certain exceptions (see below).4 For those 18 and over and considered ‘vulnerable’ according to Code 
C, the AA may be their parent, guardian or another person who cares for the adult, or someone trained 
in dealing with the vulnerable, subject to exceptions (below).5 For adults, it is preferred that the AA is 
someone with, rather than lacking in, qualifications in relation to the care of the vulnerable. However, 
should the suspect wish to have a relative (lacking in qualifications) involved, their choice should be, 
where practicable, respected.6 Notably, the AA safeguard exists on a statutory basis for those under 
18,7 but there is no equivalent statutory provision for adults.  
There are also a number of individuals who cannot – or should not – perform the AA’s role. These are: 
anyone involved in the offence, a solicitor (or other legal representative),8 an independent custody 
visitor (if present at the station for that purpose), or a victim or a witness (again, if present at the 
station for that purpose).9 Those who are police officers, employed by the police, under the direction 
or control of the chief of police, or are providing services, under a contractual arrangement to the 
police, to assist with the chief of police’s functions, are also not permitted to act as AAs.10 
 
Problems with Implementation 
Previous research has identified significant issues with the implementation of the AA safeguard, 
particularly for adult suspects. 
 
3 R. Dehaghani and C. Bath. ‘Vulnerability and the appropriate adult safeguard: examining the definitional and 
threshold changes within PACE Code C’ (2019) 3 Criminal Law Review 213. 
4 Ibid: para 1.7. 
5 Home Office, Code C 2019 (n 2): para 1.7. 
6 Ibid: Note for Guidance 1D. 
7 Crime and Disorder Act 1998 s 38(4). 
8 Home Office, Code C 2019 (n 2). Although see Dehaghani, R. and Newman, D. ‘Can – and should – lawyers be 
considered ‘appropriate’ appropriate adults?’ (2019) Howard Journal of Crime and Justice 58(1), 3; R. Dehaghani 
Vulnerability in Police Custody: police decision-making and the appropriate adult safeguard (Routledge, 2019). 
9 Home Office, Code C (n 2). For serious offences, family member are often witnesses – but are still used as AAs. 
Thus, it can be suggested that this guidance is not always adhered to – Personal Correspondence (20/12/2019) 
with Jennifer Holmes. 
10 Home Office, Code C 2019 (n 2): para 1.7.  
These issues relate to the inadequate identification of vulnerability  and the need for an AA by police 
officers, the limited availability of AAs, and variations in the quality of AAs.11 Regarding issues with 
identifying vulnerability, the National Appropriate Adult Network (NAAN) suggested that this problem 
consists of two parts: first, that the police do not have adequate training and knowledge on 
vulnerabilities; and, second, that many police officers do not request an AA owing to a lack of AA 
availability, because they are not aware of when an AA should be present, and are sceptical of the 
AA’s role.12 Additionally, NAAN also noted that many police officers do not have access to appropriate 
screening tools.13 Yet, identification of vulnerability and issues with the AA role are not the only factors 
affecting the implementation of the safeguard. Bean and Nemitz, for example, acknowledged that the 
issue is not solely with identification, but rather how police officers make sense of the information 
provided to them.14 Dehaghani’s previous and ongoing research has identified three overarching 
barriers to the implementation of the AA safeguard: definition, identification (as per previous 
research), and decision-making.15 Below we provide details on the specific issues within each of these 
barriers.  
Regarding definitions, custody officers often do not understand or consult Code C. Moreover, they 
may interpret ‘vulnerability’ in a restrictive manner. Further, the custody officer may fail to associate 
vulnerability with the need to implement the AA safeguard. There are also numerous barriers to 
identification: custody officers may lack the relevant skills, knowledge and training that would have 
allowed them to identify vulnerability; they may not always trust what suspects say and could view 
some sources – e.g. fellow officers, custody records and healthcare professionals (HCPs) – as more 
authoritative than others – e.g. self-reports and information from family members; and they do not 
have the appropriate tools through which to identify vulnerability. However, the tools that are 
available to custody officers – such as the risk assessment – are often not fully utilised. Further, even 
where vulnerability has been identified, custody officers may decide not to implement the AA 
safeguard. They may, for example, defer to the HCP, Forensic Medical Examiner (FME) or Approved 
Mental Health Practitioner (AMHP);16 they may take into consideration the offence type and its 
seriousness, including the likelihood of the case reaching court; and may also give the suspect a 
‘choice’ in the matter (without explaining the advantages and disadvantages of obtaining an AA). In 
instances where a legal representative is present, the custody officer may take the view that the legal 
representative can ‘act’ as an AA.17 Custody officers also take into account the length of time it may 
take to secure an AA and the cost of securing an AA/paying for the AA service. There are, however, 
factors that may persuade a custody officer to implement the AA safeguard: custody officers are 
reluctant to challenge the legal representative if the legal representative is adamant that an AA must 
 
11 C. Bath et al There to Help: Ensuring Provision of Appropriate Adults for Mentally Vulnerable Adults Detained 
or Interviewed by Police (National Appropriate Adult Network, 2015) p.4. 
12 Ibid p.11. 
13 Ibid. 
14 P. Bean and T. Nemitz Out of Depth and Out of Sight (University of Loughborough, 1995). 
15 Dehaghani, Vulnerability in Police Custody (n 8). 
16 Code C neither expressly prohibits nor allows such an approach. However, it does make clear that the decision 
rests with the custody officer. As such, it is questionable whether the decision should rest with a 
medical/healthcare professional. It is also important to note that medical/healthcare professionals may lack the 
necessary legal – and often medical/mental health – training and knowledge necessary to make such a decision 
on the AA safeguard.  
17 This is despite the fact that the AA and legal representative perform different roles, that this approach is 
prohibited within Code C, and that the AA, fundamentally, is an additional legal entitlement for vulnerable 
suspects whereas all suspects are entitled to legal advice and representation.  
be provided;18 and/or they may believe that the suspect is genuinely in need of an AA and it is thus in 
that person’s best interests that an AA is secured. Moreover, as noted above, custody officers consider 
offence seriousness; where the offence is one of significant seriousness (such as murder, rape, or 
arson with intent to endanger life, for example) they may decide to implement the AA safeguard as a 
precautionary measure, even where the suspect is not considered vulnerable.  
Remedies for non-implementation  
Dehaghani, in her previous work,19 identified two principal remedies for non-implementation of the 
AA safeguard. The first, and most notable, is addressed through the case itself, through the exclusion 
of evidence on the basis of ss 76 and 78 of PACE.20 Section 76 PACE allows for a confession – ‘any 
statement wholly or partly adverse to the person who made it; whether made to a person in authority 
or not and whether made in words or otherwise’21 – to be excluded at trial where it has been obtained 
through oppression or as a consequence of something said or done which was likely, in the 
circumstances existing at the time, to render it unreliable. The relevant circumstances can include a 
non-implementation of the AA safeguard in breach of the requirements under Code C. However, s 76 
includes confession evidence only; any evidence that is gathered on the basis of this excluded 
confession remains admissible,22 unless it falls within the remit of s 78. Section 78 provides that any 
evidence can be excluded if it is considered to ‘‘have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the 
proceedings that [it ought not to be admitted]’. The court may also, or instead, issue a direction to the 
jury under s 77 PACE in Crown Court trials. Section 77 allows for a direction to the jury where a 
‘mentally handicapped’ person confessed in the absence of an ‘independent person’. As Dehaghani 
illustrates, however, the courts have interpreted ‘independent person’ to include a solicitor or legal 
representative. As such, if a suspect is attended by a solicitor or legal representative but is not 
provided with an AA, the judge may decide that a jury direction under s 77 is not required.23 The courts 
have also read s 77 in conjunction with ss 76 and 78, such that the presence of a solicitor or legal 
representative could render the confession reliable (and therefore admissible) and/or could render 
the proceedings fair.24 
Thus, remedies for non-implementation can be found in the rules of evidence in PACE, but a case must 
reach trial before the rules of evidence can act as a remedy for non-implementation of the safeguard. 
There are a few obstacles to using the exclusionary rules of evidence as a remedy: first, the case must 
reach the court; second, the breach must be raised by counsel at trial – an issue that is worsened by 
restrictions on legal aid; third, the court may decide that the breach does not render the evidence 
inadmissible; and fourth, worse still, the court may actually condone police malpractice.25 It is worth 
noting that cases often do not reach trial; indeed, as Jackson has noted, the police station is more 
 
18 Arguably because said legal representative may raise this issue later in the proceedings, such as at court when 
decisions are being made as to the admissibility of evidence under ss 76 and 78 of PACE. 
19 Dehaghani (n 8).  
20 These provisions apply to trials held summarily (i.e., in the magistrates’ court) and trials held on indictment 
(i.e., in the Crown Court) and may be applied by the trial court or may be used on appeal. 
21 PACE s 82(1).  
22 PACE s 76 (4). 
23 Dehaghani (n 8). 
24 Ibid. See also R. Dehaghani ‘He’s Just Not That Vulnerable: Exploring the Implementation of the Appropriate 
Adult Safeguard in Police Custody’ (2016) 55 (4) Howard Journal of Crime and Justice 396, 408-409; D. Dixon  Law 
in Policing: Legal Regulation and Police Practices (Oxford University Press, 1997) p174.; M. McConville, A. 
Sanders and R. Leng The Case for the Prosecution: Police Suspects and the Construction of Criminality (Routledge, 
1991); D. McBarnet Conviction: Law, the State and the Construction of Justice (Macmillan, 1981) p.155. 
25 See Dehaghani (n 8). 
routinely becoming the site of the trial, with fewer and fewer cases reaching court.26 It is therefore 
important that scrutiny, oversight and accountability of police decision-making is not left until the trial 
stage.  
The second remedy for non-implementation arises in the form of a complaint to the Independent 
Office of Police Conduct (IOPC). Yet, problems also emerge with this potential avenue. First, suspects 
may not know to make a complaint, owing to their vulnerability or otherwise. Second, suspects even 
when making a complaint may not feel able to navigate the complaints process. Whilst the IOPC has 
been conducting work to improve the complaints process, particularly for those with mental health 
problems,27 problems will nevertheless remain, particularly where individuals do not have ready 
access to advice and advocacy. Dehaghani’s analysis of reported IOPC (then IPCC – Independent Police 
Complaints Commission) complaints in 2016 found only one complaint which mentioned the AA 
safeguard and, it should be noted, this complaint was not made on the basis of AA non-
implementation.28 
Part 2: An Alternative for Scrutiny and Oversight  
Given that many cases are effectively tried at the police station, it is important to ensure effective and 
proper implementation of the AA safeguard at this first – and often only – stage in the criminal process. 
This goal could be achieved through ICVs and their SMs.  
ICVs are volunteers who make ‘unannounced visits to police custody to check on the rights, 
entitlements, wellbeing and dignity of detainees held in police custody, reporting to [Police and Crime 
Commissioners] and Policing Authorities who hold Chief Constables to account’.29 The number of 
times an ICV visits a police station per year varies between schemes and is also significantly impacted 
by circumstances such as the COVID-19 pandemic.30 However, it seems that the minimum is once a 
month. SMs, on the other hand, are those who oversee the work of the volunteers; SMs are typically 
paid individuals who work within the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC).  
ICV schemes are largely organised into areas covered by the PCC and those with Mayors (City of 
London and Greater Manchester).31 The Independent Custody Visiting Association (ICVA)32 supports, 
leads, and represents the 46 member schemes across England and Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, 
and Jersey. The responsibility for ‘drawing together issues and identifying trends emerging from visits 
 
26 J.D. Jackson ‘Responses to Salduz: Procedural Tradition, Change and the Need for Effect Defence’ (2016) 79(6) 
Modern Law Review 987. 
27 “New research reveals major barriers for people with mental health concerns making a complaint about 
policing” (IOPC, 2018) <https://www.policeconduct.gov.uk/news/new-research-reveals-major-barriers-people-
mental-health-concerns-making-complaint-about> accessed 17/02/2021. 
28 Dehaghani (n 8). 
29 “About Us” (ICVA) https://icva.org.uk/about/ accessed 17/02/2021. For a critique of custody visiting see J. 
Kendall, Regulating Police Detention: Voices from Behind Closed Doors (Policy Press, 2018). For a critique of 
(some of) Kendall’s arguments see A. Wooff, ‘John Kendall (2018). Regulating Police Detention: Voices from 
behind Closed Doors’ (2020) 14(4) Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice 1184; R. Dehaghani, ‘John Kendall 
(2018). Regulating Police Detention: Voices from behind Closed Doors’ (2018) Criminal Law Review 505. 
30 Personal Correspondence (17/02/2021) with Sherry Ralph (Chief Operational Officer) of ICVA. 
31 Ibid. 
32 ICVA ‘is a Home Office, Policing Authority and Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) funded membership 
organisation’ - “About Us” (ICVA) <https://icva.org.uk/about/> accessed 17/02/2021. 
in their area and addressing these with relevant police supervisors’33 rests with the PCCs. Further, ‘the 
PCC must have a regular and formal opportunity to raise concerns and issues with a designated senior 
officer with force-wide responsibilities.’34 Regular reports – based on visits – are provided by the 
administrator of the scheme to the PCC; ‘these reports must be discussed at PCC meetings as 
appropriate and reflected in an entry about independent custody visiting in the PCC’s own annual 
report.’35 Meetings with high-ranking officers must therefore be held and must be both regular and 
formal.36 However, it is imperative that ICVs and SMs flag any issues with the PCCs in order for that 
matter to then be actioned by high ranking officers.  
 
Similar to AAs, ICVs act to ensure fair treatment. Yet, importantly, ICVs work by visiting police stations 
to establish the quality of detainees’ treatment. First, there must be systems ‘in place to ensure that 
the output from visits is drawn rapidly to the attention of those in a position to make the appropriate 
response.’37 They can then take actions to ensure that changes are made to improve the fairness of 
this treatment e.g., by recommending that a vulnerable suspect receive an AA (even where the police 
do not categorise the individual as vulnerable). SMs may be able to provide scrutiny at a force level 
by, for example, meeting with senior officers to discuss the implementation rates vis-à-vis the AA 
safeguard for adult suspects. Yet, ICVs and their SMs may not necessarily have the skills and knowledge 
required to challenge decisions on the AA safeguard. As such, when challenging individual decisions 
or scrutinising overall AA implementation rates, ICVs and SMs may not know of the legal requirements 
for the AA safeguard and the barriers to implementation. To improve the uptake of the AA safeguard 
through the scrutiny and oversight provided by ICVs and SMs, it is imperative that ICVs and SMs are 




To provide ICVs and SMs with the confidence and knowledge to scrutinise police decision-making on 
the AA safeguard, a training event was arranged (with funding from the ESRC, and additional funding 
in 2019/20 from Cardiff School of Law and Politics). The event sought to do the following:   
• Train ICVs and SMs on the nature of the AA safeguard; 
• Train ICVs and SMs on the definition of ‘vulnerability’ under Code C; 
• Train ICVs and SMs on the risks of non-implementation of the AA safeguard; 
• Train ICVs and SMs on the barriers to implementing the AA safeguard for adult suspects; 
including detail on how and why police custody officers make their decisions in relation to 
the safeguard, and, finally; 
• Discuss with ICVs and SMs the ways in which they can hold the police to account for 
decisions on the AA safeguard. 
 
 
33 Home Office “Code of Practice on Independent Custody Visitors” (TSO, 2013) <https://icva.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2018/11/Independent_custody_visitors_code_of_practice-1.pdf> accessed 25/02/21, para 
81. 
34 “The senior officer is usually an officer of at least the rank of Assistant Chief Constable/Commander.” Ibid, 
para 82. 
35Ibid, para 82. 
36 Personal Correspondence (17/02/2021) with Sherry Ralph (Chief Operational Officer) of ICVA. 
37 Home Office “Code of Practice on Independent Custody Visitors” (n 33), para 80. 
This face-to-face/in-person training event was originally planned for 31 March 2020 but had to be 
postponed following the Covid-19 pandemic. It was rearranged and held on 13 January 2021 as an 
online event through Zoom (owing to the restrictions placed on large face-to-face/in-person 
gatherings). To provide as much interaction as possible, the event was arranged to incorporate 
breakout rooms, which were managed by the PI (Dehaghani) and three research assistants (O’Shea, 
Riedel and Holloway). The purpose of the training was to train a number of ICVs and SMs in each force 
area, with a spread across force areas, such that they could (i) improve their own knowledge and 
practices, and (ii) pass this knowledge onto other ICVs/SMs in their force area. In order to do so, it was 
decided that a training pack would be provided and that this would consist of: (i) PowerPoint slides 
(those used for the session), (ii) a visual storyboard, and (iii) a visual ‘playbook’. These materials were 
provided to attendees and to other ICVA members via an email from Sherry Ralph (ICVA’s Chief 
Operational Officer).  
Ethics 
Ethics approval was granted by the School Research Ethics Committee (SREC) at Cardiff School of Law 
and Politics in respect of (i) the training event and the data gathered therefrom, and (ii) the pre- and 
post-training surveys [SREC/20022006 and SREC/19022004].  
Throughout this report, the identity of attendees/respondents is protected through the use of pseudo-
anonymisation, whereby attendees/respondents, where relevant, are referred to only by their role 
(ICV or SM), location (England and Wales; Northern Ireland; Scotland; Isle of Man) and breakout room 
number (R1-R4). In doing so, we minimise the risk of jigsaw identification. Attendees/respondents 
were advised that the main event (and their comments therein) and their responses in the breakout 
rooms would be recorded, subject to pseudo-anonymisation (outlined above). Moreover, 
attendees/respondents were advised that participation in the event and the surveys was entirely 
voluntary; they could withdraw by (i) not attending the event and/or (ii) not submitting their response 
to the survey(s). Attendees/respondents were provided with participant information sheets and were 
given ample opportunity to ask questions regarding the research.  
Recruitment 
Attendees were recruited via an email sent to all ICVs and SMs through ICVA’s Newsletter; recruitment 
was achieved through volunteer sampling.38  Out of the 63 attendees, the majority were situated in 
21 police forces in England39 with some from elsewhere in the UK (1 in Scotland,40 1 in Northern 
Ireland,41 and 3 police forces in Wales42). Of the 63 attendees, 39 were ICVs, 23 were SMs and one 
person was in a different role.43 
Methods 
Before the session, pre-training surveys were sent via email to attendees. The pre-training survey 
sought to assess the attendee/respondent’s overall knowledge of the AA safeguard and their 
expectations of the event. The results of the survey were analysed by O’Shea and discussed with 
Dehaghani who then ensured that the training event – in both content and delivery – was geared 
 
38 V. Jupp.  The sage dictionary of social research methods (SAGE Publications, 2006) 322-323. 
39 There are 39 police forces in England – see “Police” (HMICFRS) 
<https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/police-forces/police-forces/> accessed 25/02/21. 
40 There is one police force in Scotland – Police Scotland. 
41 There is one police force in Northern Ireland – the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). 
42 There are four police forces in Wales – Dyfed Powys, Gwent, North Wales, and South Wales. 
43 The specific role has not been identified as doing so would increase the risk of jigsaw identification.  
towards attendees’ needs. The post-training survey was designed to ascertain whether there had been 
any improvements in attendee/respondent knowledge and confidence levels through self-
assessment. Attendees/respondents were also asked to rate their knowledge and confidence in the 
pre- and post-training surveys and these ratings were compared in aggregate to ascertain whether the 
event had improved knowledge and confidence in respect of the AA safeguard. We also asked 
attendees/respondents to provide their top three learning outcomes for the event (pre-training) and 
to assess whether these outcomes had been met by the event (post-training). We provided space for 
attendees/respondents to advise us of good practice within their force area vis-à-vis the AA safeguard. 
In addition, the post-training survey results allow us to ascertain how to further improve the content 
of the training, with a view to delivering additional training in future. Notes were also taken at the 
event in both the main session (where applicable) and the breakout rooms (as above).  
 
Part 3: Results 
Pre-Training Survey Results   
From analysing the survey results, it was evident that, among the 
53 respondents, there was a lack of confidence in their knowledge 
of the safeguard. This appeared to stem from a lack of experience 
with the AA safeguard, i.e., some respondents only had experience 
of the safeguard through the reading of custody records or in their 
initial training.44  
When asked to rate their knowledge of the AA safeguard this lack 
of experience meant that 52 respondents rated their knowledge – 
on average – at 2.92 out of a possible 5 (with 1 being poor 
knowledge and 5 being excellent knowledge).45 When providing an 
explanation of the factors influencing this rating, respondents said 
that they felt that whilst they vaguely knew of the safeguard, their 
knowledge lacked depth and so they did not feel comfortable with giving themselves a higher rating. 
This was echoed when 52 respondents were asked to explain why they had rated their knowledge on 
the implementation of the safeguard as 2.52 on average. However, it should be noted that whilst this 
lack of confidence was the case for most of our respondents, there were a minority (N = 14) who felt 
that they were well-versed in the safeguard with some having previously been AAs or having come 
into contact with AAs through prior personal experiences and in previous roles. 
We also asked why respondents had signed up for the event; the responses indicated that they were 
eager to improve their confidence and knowledge in respect of the safeguard. 10 respondents also 
said that they wanted to train others about the safeguard following the event. 
As noted above, in preparation for the event, we asked respondents to outline their top three key 
learning outcomes. The most common key learning outcomes were as follows: (1) to understand the 
role of an AA and to be able to identify when one is needed (mentioned 32 times), (2) to be able to 
understand how vulnerability is identified and to become better at doing so (identified 19 times), (3) 
 
44 It must be noted that not all ICVs would have had training on the AA safeguard. 








to train others (10 times) and/or generally be more informed in carrying out their role (noted 28 
times). 
Respondents were asked to contribute any additional comments including experiences of good 
practice. In response to this, 24 detailed their experiences with AAs; they noted that interactions with 
AAs had further dwindled following the COVID-19 pandemic. Another 3 respondents discussed AA 
schemes established in their locality or how proficient the custody officers were at requesting AAs.  
 
Event Results   
Structure and Content of the Training 
During the training session, Dehaghani utilised an approach that extended beyond lecturing attendees 
about the safeguard, but also – as noted above – used interactive Mentimeter software to integrate 
Question and Answer sections into the session, in addition to the use of breakout rooms for in-depth 
discussion on key points. 
The structure of the event went as follows: the training began with summarising the results of the pre-
training survey and reassuring the attendees that the majority of their desired learning outcomes 
would be included in the training. Following this, attendees were introduced to the AA safeguard, 
including: a description of the role, who can and cannot perform the role, and a brief account of the 
reason for the introduction of the safeguard within PACE Code C. Moreover, whilst the event focused 
on the implementation issues for adults, early in the event, the categories of vulnerability, vis-à-vis 
the safeguard, were explored. After this introduction, issues with the implementation of the safeguard 
were discussed as per previous research (as noted earlier in this report). Thereafter, ICVs and SMs 
were informed of the various risks of non-implementation and the benefits of having an AA present.  
The following section of the training was dedicated to exploring barriers to the implementation of the 
safeguard, based on Dehaghani’s ethnographic research on police custody.46 The first of these barriers 
focused on the definition of ‘vulnerability’ and its impact upon the identification of vulnerability/need 
for an AA. Dehaghani emphasised the vagueness of Code C (and notably how it is subject to 
interpretation), and the manner in which the Code C definitions of vulnerability were interpreted by 
custody officers. In doing so, she drew out the core themes of her research: that custody officers did 
not understand the Code C provisions, that suspects were expected to ‘present’ as vulnerable, that 
those who were medicated were deemed not to be in need of the AA safeguard, and that 
‘vulnerability’ was interpreted as equivalent to ‘childlike’ behaviour or ‘abnormality’. Custody officers 
also lacked an understanding of the scope of ‘mental disorder’ as per the Mental Health Act Code of 
Practice,47 and, for example, deemed those on the Autism Spectrum as ‘highly intelligent’ and 
therefore not in need of an AA. Throughout, Dehaghani challenged these assumptions with reference 
to research and the Code C requirements.  
Thereafter, Dehaghani explored the ways in which vulnerability could be identified, such as through 
records and risk assessments, assessment by medical professionals (HCPs, FMEs, and AMHPs) and 
“informants” (arresting officers, the suspect, family members, and the aforementioned medical 
professionals), and observation. Dehaghani also explored the problems and obstacles that can arise 
when using these means of identification: the limited scope of the risk assessments, particularly the 
focus on physical risk and the absence of questions designed to identify the need for an AA; the 
 
46 See Dehaghani, Vulnerability in Police Custody (n 8). 
47 Department of Health, “Mental Health Act 1983: Code of Practice” (TSO, 2015) p.26. 
limitations on medical professionals’ knowledge of the AA safeguard (namely the legal requirements, 
but also the (often) lack of mental health training); the difficulties in using observational methods to 
identify vulnerability as this requires that there is an outward presentation of internal (mental) 
conditions; records (history) were not always used (and could be, in any event, only partial or 
erroneous); and the subjective nature of decision-making such that obtaining an AA may depend upon 
a custody officer ‘lottery’. Dehaghani also pointed to the ‘hierarchy’ of ‘informants’’ whereby custody 
officers more readily accepted the information provided by other officers and medical professionals 
and privileged these over the information provided by suspects (who were noted by officers as 
inherently unreliable).  
Dehaghani then explored decision-making, including the dissuasive and persuasive factors that may 
provide an obstacle to, or encourage, the use of the AA safeguard. The dissuasive factors explored 
were: (i) the presence of a solicitor/legal representative (as they were viewed as an adequate 
‘substitute’ for an AA); (ii) the costs – both in time and money – of calling an AA; (iii) advice from HCP, 
FME or AMHP (yet this could also be persuasive); and/or (iv) the suspect’s ‘choice’ (although, as 
Dehaghani noted, the purpose of the AA and the benefits of having an AA were not explained to 
suspects).48 The persuasive factors explored were: (i) that an AA was requested by a solicitor/legal 
representative; (ii) that the offence was of a serious nature (because the police were keen not to ‘lose’ 
the case); (iii) previous AA;49 and/or (iv) that officers believed that obtaining an AA would be of benefit 
to the suspect and would ensure fairness.  
Dehaghani thereafter examined why officers take into account offence seriousness and highlighted 
that the police are keen not to lose ‘serious’ cases and these cases are more likely to be scrutinised by 
lawyers and, crucially, reach the courts. Dehaghani also explored the courts’ and IOPC’s impact on 
accountability and how this is somewhat limited (see earlier).  
The event concluded with an explanation of what ICVs and SMs could do to improve the uptake of the 
AA safeguard. For ICVs, the training would allow them to have knowledge about the provision of AA 
services. They would also – in the context of adult detainees – have a more developed understanding 
of vulnerability both generally and under the scope of Code C. Additionally, training would empower 
them to question custody officers when the AA safeguard is not implemented. This questioning would 
then be informed by their improved knowledge of “obstacles” to the safeguard and, from this 
questioning, they may then be able to challenge the decision. In the case of SMs, the training would 
enable them to communicate more constructively with ICVs about the implementation of the AA 
safeguard such as asking ICVs about how often they encounter vulnerable adult suspects who are not 
provided with AAs. SMs could also speak to Inspectors/Custody Managers and ask them about their 
implementation rates, comparing the ideal with the actual force average.50 This improvement would 
then be eased by keeping these lines of communication open. Furthermore, communication between 
 
48 Code C also appears not to give suspects any choice in the matter – if the suspect is vulnerable, they must be 
provided with an AA. See generally Home Office, Code C (n 2). This last point was emphasised as many suspects 
do not know what the safeguard is and so do not fully understand the choice that they are being asked to make. 
49 It is worth noting that decision-making was often guided by records (as noted above) and that the officer may 
decide to simply obtain an AA because the suspect had had one previously. However, there were also 
suggestions that some suspects, owing to their regular/frequent contacts with the police and the criminal justice 
system, knew the system well and therefore did not require an AA – see Dehaghani, Vulnerability in Police 
Custody (n 8). 
50 There to Help 3 places this implementation rate at 6% across England and Wales. This compares with the 
estimated 39% (at least) of adults who may actually need an AA – see C. Bath and R. Dehaghani There to Help 3: 
the identification of vulnerable adult suspects and application of the appropriate adult safeguard in police 
investigations in 2018/19 (National Appropriate Adult Network, 2020). 
SMs would also be valuable as then the approaches of different schemes and forces could be 
compared and could be used to inform and guide further work in this area.  
The event then ended with a recap of the take-away messages relating to definition, identification, 
and decision-making. 
Discussion in main session   
Whilst the majority of attendees’ discussion took place in the breakout rooms, several questions were 
raised in the main session. At the beginning of the session, one attendee asked how AAs are appointed 
and Dehaghani responded with an explanation of the complexities of AA scheme organisation across 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland (particularly in E&W). Another attendee asked if vulnerability 
had to be confirmed, to which Dehaghani explained that the standard that must be met is ‘reason to 
suspect’ and, as such, custody officers must only have a suspicion that the person is vulnerable before 
obtaining an AA. Some questions did not directly relate to the AA safeguard but touched upon risk 
(broadly defined): one attendee asked how police should respond to an unmedicated person in a 
psychotic state who has the propensity to become violent; Dehaghani responded by saying that the 
physical risk would need to be evaluated and explained how such risks could be managed by the HCP 
and the custody officer. Finally, one attendee asked if, as an ICV, they could ask the HCP if they have 
had mental health training, to which Dehaghani explained that this would be a valuable question but 
that there was no legal obligation that HCPs had specialist mental health training.  
 
Discussion in breakout rooms 
Throughout the session, breakout rooms were used to discuss specific questions; the discussion was 
thus framed according to these questions.  
1. Do you agree with the purpose of the AA safeguard? Should it be amended? Why? How? 
This question was posed after the purpose had been explained. In response to these questions, the 
majority of attendees agreed with the purpose of the safeguard, but nevertheless had suggestions for 
how it could be improved. The vast majority were enthusiastic about the role of the AA and thought 
that more information should be provided to ICVs on this matter. The consensus was that the AA’s 
role should cover more than simply the interview and that AAs should be present, as Code C requires, 
for various processes and procedures. Some noted, however, that the AA’s presence, echoing 
Dehaghani’s findings, seems to be restricted to interview. Yet, it was noted by ICVs/SMs that the AA’s 
presence throughout the custody process could be impractical. Other concerns regarding different 
aspects of the question included the attendees scrutinising the knowledge of each party, querying 
whether all agencies are prioritising the same factors (such as the best interests of the suspect). 
Additionally, concerns were raised regarding the use of family members as AAs. Some attendees 
opposed this fully whilst others questioned how effective family members would be at fulfilling the 
role, owing to their lack of training and knowledge. There were also concerns about the lack of a 
statutory requirement for AAs for adults in England and Wales; R1 SM Scotland highlighted that AAs 
were potentially soon to be a statutory requirement for all vulnerable suspects and witnesses in 
Scotland. 
2. Do you agree with the categories of vulnerability? Yes/No? Why/Why not? 
The majority of attendees disagreed with the categories of vulnerability under Code C as they were 
perceived as too narrow in scope and application. There were concerns raised regarding the custody 
officers’ focus on presentation (as noted above) and mental health awareness (as also noted above). 
There were also particular concerns about “regular” visitors, i.e., those who are arguably vulnerable 
but not perceived as such as they come into regular contact with the police and criminal justice system 
and are deemed to, thus, ‘know the system’.51 Specific concerns were also raised regarding those on 
the Autism Spectrum and how, often, they were not supported. Moreover, there were concerns 
regarding the fluctuation of a suspect’s condition whilst in custody and, crucially, whether any 
deterioration of the suspect’s condition would be properly identified by custody staff and thus 
whether this would trigger the AA safeguard.  
In terms of application, attendees noted how the severity of the charge was important; they 
elaborated on the discussion in the main session through critiquing how custody officers may 
approach vulnerability in the context of offences with different severity. This point then prompted 
some to evaluate how subjective the categories could be interpreted and another attendee – R1-ICV2 
(E&W) – raised their concerns regarding how custody officers may defer to HCPs (and other medical 
professionals) and how the decision-making may thus narrow, owing to the HCPs lack of legal 
knowledge on vulnerability and the need for/role of the AA. 
Attendees also discussed the issue of ‘presentation’ (noted above), specifically the reliance of custody 
officers on the suspect’s ‘presentation’ as a means through which to identify whether an AA was 
required. Whilst this point was being explored, one respondent – R4-ICV (E&W) – explained that they 
have seen custody officers being dismissive of a suspect as ‘drunk’ when, in fact, the suspect was 
actually in a hypoglycaemic state.  R4-ICV (E&W) explained that they recognised this only because of 
their own personal experiences with diabetes. The custody officers’ lack of awareness of the impacts 
of health conditions on a suspect was then reflected upon in respect of the AA safeguard.  
As noted above, the subjectivity of categories can engender inconsistencies; attendees suggested that 
procedural safeguards be put in place such as two officers having to check the initial decision. 
Attendees also suggested that mandatory mental health training be provided to officers, along with 
refresher sessions on the content of Code C. It was noted by some attendees that, in their experience, 
officers deem it impractical to review and remember Code C in-depth. The practicalities of reform 
were then discussed; one ICV – R4-ICV2 (E&W) – explained that they thought it unavoidable that 
decisions were made based on experience and “emotional gut feelings”. However, despite this ‘gut 
feeling’ being universally acknowledged, attendees felt that greater accountability on the part of 
individual officers would be a step in a more positive direction. Additionally, R1-ICV1 (E&W), said they 
felt that a more mental health-aware “culture shift” would take place with the retiring of older custody 
officers and the intake of new staff. It was also acknowledged (as mentioned above) how custody 
officers’ encounters with “regular” visitors can cause custody officers to be more dismissive of 
underlying conditions even when these “regular” visitors fall within the Code C categories (R1-ICV3 
(E&W)). This conflicted with the discussion previously had by attendees who believed that “regular” 
visitors would be more able to gain access to an AA if they had previously had one.52 
Those who agreed with the categories acknowledged these weaknesses (above). However, whilst not 
in disagreement with the categories, these attendees nevertheless thought that the categories were 
in need of a vital update. 
 
51 See Dehaghani, Vulnerability in Police Custody (n 8).  
52 Although, as Dehaghani has noted, the ‘previous AA’ approach was nuanced – some ‘regulars’ received the 
AA, yet others did not because they were said to ‘know the system’ - see Dehaghani, Vulnerability in Police 
Custody (n 8). 
3. What do you think could be the specific barriers under each category? 
In answering this question, attendees were given one potential barrier - definition, identification or 
decision-making - each with the fourth group assigned the task of discussing ‘other’ potential barriers. 
Definition 
The attendees’ thoughts on barriers presented by the definition were summarised in the following 
points. R1-Panel Coordinator (E&W) said that “everyone is vulnerable, but perhaps need to 
scale/respond to specific vulnerabilities.” This reflected prior concerns on categorisation and was also 
seen to impact the practicalities. R1-ICV3(E&W) believed that the term “functional test” – one used 
by Dehaghani and Bath53 – would benefit custody officers’ understanding of Code C and could develop 
their use of the vulnerability criteria. 
Identification 
Attendees felt that identification was a very complex issue that required a multi-faceted approach to 
overcome any existing barriers. The issues that they highlighted were (i) self-identification and (ii) how 
to account for ‘less severe’54 vulnerabilities. 
The attendees in this breakout room believed that ‘self-identification’ was helpful to some extent, but 
some attendees were concerned that some suspects may not understand the questions asked on the 
risk assessment and may not wish to identify themselves as ‘vulnerable’, whereas others will falsely 
label themselves as ‘vulnerable’ as a form of manipulation and control.55 Then in discussing “less 
severe” vulnerabilities, attendees explained that they believed police forces would be willing to 
magnify vulnerabilities to ensure that they get the benefit of an AA if they believed the AA would 
benefit them as well as the suspect.   
Decision Making 
Attendees identified several factors that could affect decision-making which included (i) cost, (ii) 
subjectivity of the officer and ‘experience’ of the suspect such as the effect of detention in police 
custody on the individual, (iii) familiarity, and (iv) legal representation. The main concern was the time 
taken for AAs to attend and how this may interact with the statutory time limits on detention in 
custody.56 It was also queried whether, in the time available to them, custody officers could 
adequately identify vulnerability according to the ‘functional test’. The monetary cost was also raised 
as a concern, particularly where AAs are paid rather than voluntary. The barrier posed by the 
subjectivity of decision-making was also explored; here, concerns were raised regarding custody 
officers’ unconscious bias (particularly issues such as institutional racism and the bearing this may 
have on the interpretation of ‘vulnerability’) and how different officers may place value on different 
factors when making their decision as to whether an AA is required (such as the suspect’s prior 
experience in police custody or the presence of a solicitor). There were also concerns that suspects 
would be keen to leave the custody suite as quickly as possible and, for that reason, may decide that 
 
53 Dehaghani and Bath (n 3).  
54 It is understood that ICVs meant those who had a health condition but did not require additional support 
beyond having access to (and being able to take) medication. It should be noted that Code C does not suggest 
that there is a spectrum or sliding scale.  
55 This latter element was also suggested by custody officers in their disbelief of (some) suspects – see 
Dehaghani, Vulnerability in Police Custody (n 8).  
56 Suspects can be held for up to 24 hours prior to charge under PACE s 41. This can, however, be extended – 
see PACE s 42. 
they do not wish to have an AA present.57 Concerns were also noted in relation to the variable levels 
of detail on custody records.58 
Post-training Survey Results  
The responses to the post-training survey will now be explored. 
Respondents were asked to rate their current knowledge of 
the AA safeguard; across the 33 respondents, knowledge was 
rated at an aggregate average of 4.03 (out of a possible 5). 
When asked why they rated their knowledge as such, 31 
respondents said that they felt that the session had 
“improved [their] knowledge”, made them feel “much more 
informed” and had generally broadened their understanding 
and knowledge of the safeguard. Five respondents also noted 
that, on the basis of the training, they were keen to continue 
developing their knowledge on the AA safeguard.  
Respondents were also asked to rate their understanding of 
the implementation of the safeguard; in aggregate this was 
ranked as 3.88. When asked why they had rated their 
understanding in this way, respondents explained that they 
felt that the training had “cleared many misconceptions 
around the safeguard”, made them “more aware of the 
subjectivity of assessing vulnerability” and had informed them of procedure. However, 2 respondents 
felt that they still needed to conduct additional research. 
Respondents were also asked to recount their learning outcomes (as previously described in 
discussion of the pre-training survey); all respondents stated that their learning outcomes had been 
met, but 8 said that their learning objectives had been only partially achieved owing to the time 
restrictions on the event (9:30am to 1pm).  
When rating the training session, respondents gave it a score of 4.09 (out of a possible 5), explaining 
that, whilst the training was clear, informative, and engaging, they struggled with the online delivery 
of the event and, notably, the use of digital tools (Mentimeter quizzes) for some parts of the session.59 
Respondents were also asked if they would like to provide feedback on the event. 2 respondents’ 
answers concerned the technical aspects of the training – they wanted fewer interactive tools to 
simplify the session – whilst others mentioned concerns about timing and wished that the training had 
taken place over two half-days. 
 
Comparing pre- and post-training results   
It is evident that the training event has improved attendees’ knowledge and understanding of 
vulnerability and the AA safeguard and the barriers to implementing the AA safeguard. Respondents 
 
57 Although note earlier that the suspect does not actually have this choice. 
58 See, for example, Sanders, A. et al, Advice and Assistance at Police Stations and the 24 Hour Duty Solicitor 
Scheme (Lord Chancellor's Department, 1989). 
59 It should be noted that, as volunteers, many ICVs are retirees and may therefore come from an older 






to the survey rated their knowledge and understanding more highly in the post-training survey as 
compared with pre-training – with the averages increasing from 2.92 to 4.03 (when rating their 
knowledge of the safeguard) and 2.52 to 3.88 (when ranking their understanding of the 
implementation of the AA safeguard). Impact is also demonstrated through respondents feeling 
confident in using technical language and their active engagement in the debates and discussions 
highlighted in the session (as demonstrated by feedback). Satisfaction in the training was also 
demonstrated in respondents expressing an enthusiasm to share their new knowledge with 
colleagues. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, the training encouraged curiosity in the 
respondents, as evidenced by the 5 attendees who wish to either carry out further research or attend 
additional training on the AA safeguard. However, technical and timing issues – generated by online 
delivery owing to the pandemic – must be noted to have potentially (albeit perhaps minimally) 
reduced the efficacy of the training.  
Conclusion  
From conducting this event, ‘main lessons’ were learnt regarding the content and development of 
(future) training and any potential impacts therefrom. The central themes of ‘definition’, 
‘identification’, and ‘decision-making’ allowed the attendees to gain a comprehensive understanding 
of the barriers to implementation of the AA safeguard. The training, more generally, provided 
attendees with an understanding of who should be provided with an AA and what the AA’s role entails. 
Attendees were, however, keen to find out more about potential reform of the AA safeguard and the 
impact of Covid-19 on vulnerable suspects. Such matters, if at the time relevant, could be discussed 
in any future sessions. It is evident that in-person training is preferred over online training; a physical 
event would have been more accessible to those who are less digitally capable. The event was, 
however, successful in achieving its overall aims. Moreover, it appears that there is significant appetite 
from ICVs and SMs to improve the uptake of the AA safeguard and some attendees were very keen to 
impart their knowledge onto others in their schemes (such was one of the ambitions of the training). 
Whilst training ICVs and SMs on the AA safeguard will not, of itself, ensure that vulnerable suspects 
receive the protection to which they are legally entitled, it should certainly be used as another means 
through which to ensure compliance with the AA safeguard and through which to secure oversight 
and scrutiny of custody officer decision-making on the AA safeguard.  
 
